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It  is  well  known  that,  in  OLG  economies  with  life-cycle  saving  and  exogenous  growth, 
competitive equilibria will in general fail to achieve optimality and may even be dynamically 
ineﬃcient. This is a consequence of individuals accumulating amounts of physical capital that 
diﬀer from the level which would maximize welfare along a balanced growth path (the Golden 
Rule). With human capital, a second potential source of departure from optimality arises, to wit: 
individuals may not choose the correct amount of education investment. However, the Golden 
Rule  concept,  widely  used  in  exogenous  growth  frameworks,  has  not  found  its  way  into 
endogenous growth models. In this paper, we propose to recover the Golden Rule of physical and 
also human capital accumulation. The optimal policy to decentralize the Golden Rule balanced 
growth path when there are no constraints for individuals to ﬁnance their education investments is 
also characterized. It is shown that it involves positive pensions and negative education subsidies 
(i.e., taxes).  
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It is well known that in life-cycle growth models with only physical capital  a la Diamond (1965),
the laissez-faire equilibrium will generally not coincide with the optimum. The reason is that the
capital-labour ratio associated with private saving will be dierent from the Golden Rule one. The
implications for policy design are clear: whenever the capital-labour ratio is higher [resp. lower]
than the optimum one, intergenerational transfers from [resp. to] younger to [resp. from] older
generations are required. In the presence of endogenous human capital, however, a second potential
departure from optimality arises, as individuals may not choose the correct amount of education
investment. Thus, a second policy instrument will be required to achieve optimality, and a subsidy
to human capital investments becomes a natural candidate.
The role that can be played by education subsidies and pensions has been the object of some
interest. Boldrin and Montes (2005) show that, in the absence of credit markets, two systems of
independent intergenerational transfers (to the young from the middle-aged and to the old from the
same middle aged), can be used to replicate the laissez-faire equilibrium with credit markets (where
the middle-aged lend to the young and receive the return of this investment when retired). They
argue that, under reasonable values of the parameters, the laissez-faire equilibrium will exhibit a
rate of return to capital higher than the growth rate of the economy, a situation that they associate
with dynamic eciency. One of the purposes of this paper is precisely to show that whether the
rate of return to capital is higher or lower than the growth rate of output is no longer enough to
assess the eciency of the competitive equilibrium. The reason is that, even if physical capital
investments are too low at the laissez-faire economy, human capital investments can be too large,
and this leaves some scope for a Pareto improvement.
Clearly, in order to determine the optimal levels of physical and human capital and evaluate
the scope for Pareto improvements, we need to adopt some welfare criterion. Caball e (1995) and
Docquier, Paddison and Pestieau (2007), among others, posit that the objective of the social plan-
ner is to maximize a discounted sum of individual utilities dened over consumption levels per unit
of natural labour. We adopt a dierent approach. In line with what Diamond (1965) and Buiter
(1979) respectively do in the basic model without productivity growth and with exogenously given
productivity growth, we embrace the Golden Rule criterion. This entails the search for the bal-
anced growth path that maximizes the lifetime welfare of a representative individual subject to the
constraint that everyone else's welfare is xed at the same level. And we do so in the only sensible
way in an endogenous growth framework, i.e., by considering a utility function whose arguments
are individual consumptions per unit of ecient labour.
This social objective may seem awkward at rst and it may be worth to devote a few comments
to discuss its implications. With this purpose, let us abstract for a while from the overlapping
generations structure of the model and assume for simplicity a constant labour force in an econ-
omy experiencing increases in labour productivity at an (exogenous or endogenous) rate. Along a
balanced growth path, consumption per unit of natural labour will be increasing at this rate, so
1that consumption per unit of ecient labour will be kept constant. Under these circumstances,
if a social planner had a utility function dened over consumption per unit of natural labour, it
is clear that, for plausible specications, the utility index would be growing without limit. Since
utility will eventually be innite along a balanced growth path, there is simply no scope for utility
maximization. A way to sidestep this is to assume that the planner maximizes a discounted sum of
utilities, and this is actually the standard procedure.
However, if the social planner's utility function is dened over consumption per unit of ecient
labour, it is clear that the utility index will be nite along a balanced growth path. Hence, there is
scope for optimizing this index, so that the Golden Rule, using as control variables consumptions
per unit of labour eciency, emerges as a reasonable alternative. Intuitively, our criterion is most
pertinent if it is considered that, as productivity increases, individuals must "share in the growth
of the economy", i.e., their consumption has to increase at the same rate in order to maintain their
well-being. If we believe instead that satisfaction is determined by consumption levels alone, so that
an increase in consumption raises welfare whatever the evolution of productivity, then the utility
of consumption per unit of natural labour should the basis for an adequate social objective.1 As
it will be made clearer, both approaches are consistent with the same ordinal preferences of the
individuals of a given generation. In contrast, the treatment of dierent generations will not be
the same and, as a result, the adoption of one or the other normative approach will yield dierent
allocations of resources at the optimum.
In this paper, we embrace this Golden Rule criterion. We identify the optimum, compare it to
the laissez faire with perfect credit markets (where younger individuals can borrow to nance their
education) and identify the optimal policy. Not surprisingly, one of the conditions of the optimal
allocation is that the marginal product of physical capital (per unit of ecient labour) equals the
(endogenous) growth rate of the economy. And, as far as human capital accumulation is concerned,
a condition equating marginal benets and marginal costs is obtained. It is shown that the laissez
faire with perfect credit markets cannot possibly attain the Golden Rule. And nally, we prove that,
in order to attain the Golden Rule, education subsidies should be negative, i.e., education should be
taxed instead of subsidized. The reason is that individuals choose their human capital investments
accounting only for the eects on their earnings and loan repayment costs. Thus, when facing
the optimal (i.e., Golden Rule) wage and interest rates in the laissez faire, individuals will ignore
the costs associated with maintaining these factor prices at their Golden Rule level when human
capital increases. Under these circumstances, they over-invest in education, and a tax is required.
However, out of the Golden Rule balanced growth path, positive subsidies to education can be
welfare improving under certain conditions. Also, we show that, if education policy is modelled as
subsidies to the repayment of the loans borrowed to nance education, pension benets are to be
strictly positive in order to attain the Golden Rule.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the general endogenous growth
framework and its corresponding Golden Rule. Section 3 presents the decentralized market equilib-
1This point has been suggested to the authors by David de la Croix.
2rium in the presence of government when the tax instruments available are lump-sum taxes on both
the working and the retired population and education subsidies. Section 4 compares the laissez-
faire balanced growth path with the Golden Rule, and derives some propositions on the eciency or
ineciency of these equilibria. Section 5 characterizes the education subsidy and intergenerational
transfers consistent with the Golden Rule balanced growth path. Section 6 analyzes the comparative
dynamics in terms of both physical and human capital-labour ratios and welfare level associated
with changes in the policy parameters along any arbitrary balanced growth path. It is shown, in
particular, that the welfare eects of modifying the tax parameters depend, on the one hand, on
the relationship between the interest rate and the growth rate of the economy and, on the other, on
the impact of the individual investment in education on the present value of her lifetime resources.
Section 7 concludes and more technical details are displayed in the Appendix.
2 The Model and the Planner's Optimum
The basic framework of analysis is the overlapping generations model with both human and physical
capital developed in Boldrin and Montes (2005) and Docquier et al. (2007). At period t, Lt+1
individuals are born. They coexist with Lt middle-aged and Lt 1 old-aged. Population grows at the
exogenous rate n so that Lt = (1+n)Lt 1 with n >  1. Agents are born with an endowment of basic
"knowledge" h
y
t 1, which is measured in units of ecient labour per unit of natural labour, and is
an input in the production of future human capital ht. We assume that h
y
t 1 is an exogenously given
fraction t 1 of the existing level of knowledge, i.e., h
y
t 1 = t 1ht 1. Human capital is produced
out of the amount of output invested in education dt 1 and basic knowledge h
y
t 1 according to the
production function ht = E(dt 1;h
y
t 1). Assuming constant returns to scale, the production of
human capital can be written in intensive terms as ht=h
y
t 1 = e(~ dt 1), where e(:) satises the Inada
conditions and ~ dt 1 = dt 1=h
y
t 1 is the amount of output devoted to education per unit of inherited
human capital.
A single good Yt is produced by means of physical capital Kt and human capital Ht, according
to a constant returns to scale production function Yt = F(Kt;Ht). As explained below, only the
middle-aged work and they inelastically supply one unit of natural labour, so that Ht = htLt.
Physical capital is assumed to fully depreciate each period. If we dene kt = Kt=Lt as the physical
capital per unit of natural labour ratio and ~ kt = Kt=Ht = kt=ht as the physical capital per unit of
ecient labour ratio, the technology can be described as Yt=Ht = f(~ kt), where f(:) also satises
the Inada conditions.





t+1 denote her consumption levels as middle-aged and old-aged, respectively. This utility
function is assumed to be strictly quasi-concave and homogeneous of degree j > 0. The reason why
we only impose strict quasi-concavity instead of strict concavity of the individual utility function
is that, as it will be made clearer shortly, we are only interested in ordinal preferences. This is a
less stringent assumption than the one made in Docquier et al. (2007), who need to assume that
30 < j < 1 in order for the discounted sum of individual utilities to be well dened.
Total output produced in period t, F(Kt;Ht); can be devoted to consumption, cm
t Lt + co
tLt 1,
investment in human capital, dtLt+1, and investment in physical capital, Kt+1. Thus, the aggregate
feasibility constraint writes
F(Kt;Ht) = cm
t Lt + co
tLt 1 + dtLt+1 + Kt+1 (1)






+ (1 + n)dt + (1 + n)kt+1 (2)
Alternatively, we can divide (2) by ht, which is given at time t, and obtain the aggregate feasibility
constraint in period t measured in terms of output per unit of ecient labour:




t 1e(~ dt 1)(1 + n)
+ (1 + n)t ~ dt + te(~ dt)(1 + n)~ kt+1 (3)
where ~ cm
t = cm
t =ht and ~ co
t = co
t=ht 1 denote respectively consumption when middle-aged and con-
sumption when old-aged per unit of ecient labour.2 Note that ht+1=ht = te(~ dt) = 1+gt+1, where
gt+1 is the growth rate of productivity from period t to period t + 1.
Along a balanced growth path, all variables expressed in terms of output per unit of natural
labour are growing at rate g. In consequence, all variables expressed in terms of output per unit of
ecient labour remain constant: ~ cm
t = ~ cm
t+1 = ~ cm, ~ co
t = ~ co
t+1 = ~ co, ~ kt = ~ kt+1 = ~ k and ~ dt = ~ dt+1 = ~ d.
We can now turn to the discussion of the planner's objective. In the presence of productivity
growth that translates into consumption growth (as is, of course, the case along a balanced growth
path), consumption levels will grow without limit. This means that we cannot choose the con-
sumption levels that maximize Ut = U(cm
t ;co
t+1), so that a dierent approach is required. Since the
utility function is homogeneous, and to the extent that ht is exogenously given at the beginning of
each period, we can write:















Thus, a "new" utility function is obtained by means of a monotonic transformation of the rst
one, thus ensuring that ordinal preferences are respected. Notice that this utility function has the
same functional form as the original one and, consequently, continues to be homogeneous of degree
j. Also, the slope, curvature and higher derivatives of indierence curves in (~ cm
t ;~ co
t+1) space are the
same as those of the corresponding indierence curves in (cm
t ;co
t+1) space. In particular, they will
be independent of the level of labour eciency.
Therefore, the arguments of the "new" utility function in (4) are consumptions per unit of
ecient labour. We can now posit that the social planner's objective is to choose the balanced
2Note that c
m
t Lt and c
o










t in terms of units of output per unit of ecient labour follows naturally.
4growth path that maximizes the welfare of a representative individual subject to the constraint
that everyone attains the same utility level, i.e., U(~ cm;~ co). We adopt this approach, which is
reminiscent of Diamond (1965)'s original treatment of the Golden Rule in an OLG framework with
productive capital.3 Then, the social planner will choose (~ cm;~ co;~ k; ~ d) that maximize U(~ cm;~ co)
subject to the balanced growth path version of (3).4






)=@~ co = (1 + g)(1 + n) (5)





[(1 + g)(1 + n)]







(1 + g)(1 + n)
= f(~ k)   (1 + g)(1 + n)~ k   (1 + n)~ d (8)
1 + g = e(~ d) (9)
Denition 1 The Golden Rule balanced growth path (~ cm
 ;~ co
;~ k; ~ d) provides the maximum level of
welfare that can be achieved by a representative individual, subject to the feasibility constraint and
the additional constraint that everyone else attains the same level. It is characterized by expressions
(5)-(9).
The interpretation of these equations is simpler if we start from the exogenous productivity
growth setting, that we obtain for a given g and (without loss of generality) ~ d = 0. Then, the Golden
Rule is characterized by (5), (6) and (8) with g given and ~ d = 0 (see Buiter, 1979). Equation (5) is
the equality of the marginal rate of substitution between second and third period consumptions and
the counterpart in the current model of the so-called "biological" interest rate, i.e., the economy's
growth rate. Equation (6) is the equality of the marginal product of physical capital (per unit of
ecient labour) and the growth rate of labour measured in eciency units (i.e., the sum of the rates
at which the eciency of labour and the natural units of labour respectively grow). Of course, if
g = 0 we are back to Diamond's framework and we obtain the original Golden Rule.
3Thus, in the pure tradition of the Golden Rule approach, we take sides with Samuelson in his old controversy
with Lerner published in the Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 67 No. 5 (Oct. 1959) pp. 512-525. The alternative
approach would emphasize instead the allocation of consumption across dierent generations concurring at time t.
4Alternatively, we could state this problem in terms of the choice of variables expressed in units of natural









t+1=ht) subject to c
m
t =ht + (c
o
t+1=ht)(ht=ht+1)=(1 + n) =
f(kt+1=ht+1)   (1 + n)te
 1 (ht+1=tht)   (1 + n)kt+1=ht. Notice that, by choosing ht+1, the planner is indirectly
setting dt = thte
 1 (ht+1=tht). It is easy to verify that the results are the same whether the planner chooses the
variables in terms of output per unit of natural labour or per unit of ecient labour.
5Turning now to the endogenous growth framework, (5) and (6) continue to hold with the same
interpretation, with g being obtained from (9). Equation (7), however, requires a careful expla-
nation. It points out that, along the optimal balanced growth path, the marginal benet of an
increase in the amount of output devoted to education (again per unit of ecient labour) must
be equal to its marginal cost. This can be seen using the aggregate feasibility constraint (8). A
rise in ~ d has a direct cost in terms of the third term in the RHS of (8), as it reduces consumption
possibilities by (1 + n). It also has an indirect cost, given by e0(:)(1 + n)~ k as a consequence
of the eect of a rise in ~ d on the rate of growth g: indeed, the greater the productivity growth
rate g, the greater the amount of output that must be devoted to investment in physical capital in
order to keep ~ k constant. However, a rise in ~ d (and thus in g) also has a benet, since a greater
g implies a smaller marginal rate of transformation between third and second period consumption
in the LHS of (7). This amounts to an expansion of consumption possibilities that is captured by
e0(:)(1 + n)~ co
=[(1 + g)(1 + n)]
2. At the optimum, the marginal benet and the marginal costs
must be equal:
(1 + n)e0(~ d)
~ co

[(1 + g)(1 + n)]
2 = (1 + n)e0(~ d)~ k + (1 + n) (10)
so that the terms involving (1 + n) cancel out and (7) emerges.
Note that, in the exogenous growth framework, ~ k is univocally determined by (6) and the
optimization problem can be solved sequentially. In contrast, with endogenous growth, (6) and (7)
are not enough to determine ~ k and ~ d because (7) incorporates also ~ co
, which can only be obtained
from (5) and (8). A sequential solution of the optimization problem is now impossible: all optimal
variables are determined simultaneously.
3 Decentralized Market Equilibrium in the Presence of Govern-
ment
In this section we characterize the behaviour of the economy in the presence of government. Since
individuals not only decide about the allocation of their resources along their life cycle but also how
much to invest in education, there are now two potential sources of ineciencies. This is the reason
why we posit that the government has two policy instruments at its disposal: education subsidies
and intergenerational transfers from the middle-aged to the elderly. Among the dierent ways of
tackling education subsidies, we choose to model them as subsidies to the repayment, in the second
period of life, of the loans taken in the rst one to pay for education. Let zm
t > 0 [resp. < 0] be the
lump-sum tax [transfer] the middle aged pay [receive], zo
t > 0 [< 0] the lump-sum tax the old pay
[the pension they receive] and let t be the subsidy rate, all of them in period t. The laissez-faire
equilibrium can be retrieved later by setting zm
t = zo
t = t = 0:5
5It is worth emphasizing that subsidies are not modelled as direct subsidies to expenditures in education in the
rst period (as in Docquier et al., 2007) but as subsidies to the repayment of education loans. Main results concerning
the optimal education policy are however robust to alternative modelizations of this subsidy. See below.
6Factor prices are determined under perfect competition by their marginal products, so that, if
1 + rt and wt are respectively the interest factor and the wage rate per unit of ecient labour,
1 + rt = f0(~ kt) (11)
wt = f(~ kt)   ~ ktf0(~ kt) (12)
Individuals choose, in their rst period, the amount of education that maximizes their lifetime
resources. They do so by borrowing any amount they wish in perfect credit markets. Concerning
savings, they behave as pure life-cyclers, i.e., they save to transfer purchasing power from the
second to the third period. Then, for an individual born at t   1, consumption when middle-aged
and consumption when old can be written respectively
cm
t = wtht   (1 + rt)dt 1(1   t)   zm
t   st (13)
co
t+1 = (1 + rt+1)st   zo
t+1 (14)
where st are the savings of a middle-aged. Thus, the lifetime budget constraint of an individual



























= (1 + rt+1) (17)





Equation (16) shows that the individual will invest in education up to the point where the marginal
benet in terms of second period income equals the marginal cost of investing in human capital
allowing for subsidies. Rewriting (16) as e0(~ dt 1) = (1   t) (1 + r(~ kt))=w(~ kt); this expression im-
plicitly characterizes the optimal ratio ~ dt 1 as a function of ~ kt and t, i.e., ~ dt 1 = (~ kt;t): Since
e00 < 0 it can readily be shown that the greater ~ kt and t the greater ~ dt 1.
The government nances education subsidies with revenues obtained from taxing the middle-
aged and/or the old-aged:
zm
t Lt + zo
tLt 1 = t(1 + rt)dt 1Lt (18)







where !t is the present value of the net lifetime income of an individual born at t   1:




[t+1(1 + rt+1)dt   zm
t+1] (20)
7The homogeneity assumption on preferences implies that the co
t+1=cm
t ratio is a function of
rt+1 only. Substituted into the budget constraint (20) this allows us to write consumption in the
second period as a fraction of lifetime income, cm
t = (rt+1)!t: Equilibrium in the market for
physical capital is achieved when the (physical) capital stock available in t + 1; Kt+1, equals gross
savings made by the middle-aged in t; stLt, minus the amount of output devoted to human capital
investment by the young in t;(1 + n)dtLt; i.e., when
Kt+1 = stLt   (1 + n)dtLt (21)
Using (21), the budget constraints (13) and (14), the government budget constraint (18) and the
equilibrium factor prices (11) and (12), one can obtain the feasibility constraint (2).
In the current framework, a balanced growth path is a situation where all variables expressed in
units of natural labour grow at a constant rate, with the consequence that all variables expressed
in units of ecient labour remain constant over time. Therefore, ~ kt+1 = ~ kt = ~ k; ~ zm
t = ~ zm
t+1 = ~ zm;
t = t+1 =  (and, of course, t+1 = t = ): Factor prices will be given by (11) and (12) without
time subscripts. As far as consumer behaviour is concerned, since the utility function is assumed to






and (~ cm;~ co) spaces will be the
same. Summing up, a balanced growth path in the presence of government intervention will full
the following:
@U(~ cm;~ co)=@~ cm
@U(~ cm;~ co)=@~ co = (1 + r) (22)




= ^ ! (24)
where ^ !  !t=ht is the present value of lifetime resources expressed in terms of output per unit of
ecient labour:
^ ! = w  
(1 + r)~ d
(1 + g)
 
[(1 + r)~ d   (1 + g)~ zm][(1 + g)(1 + n)   (1 + r)]
(1 + r)(1 + g)
(25)
Coming back to the equilibrium condition in the market for physical capital, and as shown in
Appendix A, (21) implicitly provides ~ kt+1 as a function 	(~ kt; ~ zm
t ; ~ zm
t+1;t;t+1). Along a balanced
growth path, one can delete the time subscripts and write ~ k = 	(~ k; ~ zm;). An equilibrium ratio
of physical capital to labour in eciency units along a balanced growth path in the presence of
government intervention, ~ kG, will then be a xed point of the 	 function, i.e., ~ kG = 	(~ kG; ~ zm;).
Such an equilibrium will be locally stable provided that 0 < @	(~ kG; ~ zm;)=@~ k < 1: In what follows,
we will focus on situations where the equilibrium is unique and stable so that the relationship
between ~ k and the tax parameters can be written, with an obvious notation, as
~ k = ~ k(~ zm;) (26)
We can now turn to the determination of ~ d or, what is the same, the growth rate g. The amount
of output devoted to education per unit of inherited human capital along a balanced growth path
8will be governed by the relationship arising from the education decision (23), i.e., ~ d = (~ k;). Using





~ d = ~ d(~ zm;) (27)
Letting gG be the growth rate of any variable expressed in terms of output per unit of natural




. Finally, the growth rate of all variables
expressed in absolute terms (physical capital, human capital and output) is (1 + gG)(1 + n). This
follows from writing H [K] as hL [kL] and observing that h [k] grows at rate gG while L grows at
rate n.
Our ultimate concern is, however, to evaluate the eect of intergenerational transfers and ed-
ucation subsidies on welfare. It has already been stated that we can write individual utility as a
function of consumption per unit of ecient labour, ~ U = U(~ cm;~ co): We have also obtained the
lifetime budget constraint (24). Therefore, the demands for consumption become ~ cm = ~ cm(^ !;r)
and ~ co = ~ co(^ !;r), and the indirect utility function can be written as V (^ !;r), i.e., as a function of
the present value of lifetime resources and the relative price of old age and middle-age consumption.
Observe that the present value ^ !, in spite of being a function of a number of variables, is taken
as a parameter in the indirect utility function V (^ !;r). For later use, we can obtain the partial
derivatives of V with respect to its arguments ^ ! and r. Using (22):
@V
@^ !



































where the last equality follows in both cases from dierentiation of the lifetime budget constraint
(24).6
Coming back to function V (^ !;r), and taking into account that ^ ! = ^ !(~ k; ~ zm;); r = r(~ k) and
~ k = ~ k(~ zm;), we can write a new function that, for given values of  and n, depends only on ~ zm










. As a consequence, we end up with a new
indirect utility function,
~ U = ~ V (~ zm;) (30)
This is the relevant function to undertake the comparative dynamics. Nonetheless, before doing that,
we shall be interested in comparing the laissez-faire solution with the Golden Rule and characterizing
the optimal tax parameters that support it.
4 The Laissez-Faire Balanced Growth Path and the Golden Rule
In Diamond (1965)'s model, as well as its extension to allow for exogenous productivity growth,
the relationship between ~ k and ~ kLF (LF standing for laissez faire) can be determined, on a one to
6Clearly, ^ ! is given at this stage. The eect of r on the present value of lifetime resources ^ ! will come forth when
we dierentiate ^ ! with respect to ~ k.
9~ d
LF > ~ d ~ d
LF 6 ~ d
~ k






(1 + n) not feasible
~ k













Table 1: Dierent laissez-faire balanced growth paths
one basis, by the relationship between (1 + rLF) and (1 + gLF)(1 + n). This allows to immediately
evaluate whether the laissez-faire equilibrium is dynamically ecient or inecient. As it will shortly
be shown, this is no longer the case when we account for endogenous productivity growth.
This section has three main objectives. Firstly, we ask whether ~ kLF and ~ dLF can be respectively
greater or less than ~ k and ~ d and whether over/under accumulation of physical capital can coexist
with over/under accumulation of human capital. Secondly, we explore the consequences of this for
the relationship between f0(~ kLF) and (1 + gLF)(1 + n). And, nally, it is argued that neither the
relationship between ~ kLF and ~ k nor the one between f0(~ kLF) and (1 + gLF)(1 + n) are enough to
assess the dynamic eciency of the laissez-faire equilibrium: ~ dLF and ~ d need also be compared.
Since in Diamond (1965)'s model ~ kLF may either be greater or less than ~ k (and both can, by
chance, coincide), a natural conjecture is that this might be possible in the current framework as
well, and, by symmetry, that ~ dLF might also be higher/lower than (or equal to) ~ d. This conjecture
translates into the four possibilities associated with the four cells in Table 1 (neglecting, for the
moment, the content of these cells). Note, however, that one of them is not feasible. To see
this, consider a balanced growth path with ~ kLF > ~ k. As shown in Appendix B, this situation is
necessarily coupled with ~ dLF > ~ d. Thus, using the obvious matrix notation, cell a11 in Table 1
is feasible, but cell a12 is not. Furthermore, this raises the question of whether the laissez-faire is
able to support the Golden Rule, as it is indeed the case in Diamond's model for some values of the
parameters. In the current framework, however, it is not the case. This follows in a straightforward
way from the previous result: even if ~ kLF = ~ k , it will be the case that ~ dLF > ~ d, i.e., the
accumulation of human capital will be too large with respect to the Golden Rule. Moreover, as
it is also shown in Appendix B, ~ dLF = ~ d can only coexist with ~ kLF < ~ k, i.e., with a too low
accumulation of physical capital. This allows to state the following result.
Proposition 1 The laissez-faire equilibrium cannot possibly support the Golden Rule balanced
growth path.
Coming back to our conjectures, and having discarded one of them, the other three still require
verication. This can be done with the help of the Cobb-Douglas case discussed in Appendix C,
where the functional forms are f(~ k) = A~ k (A > 0,  2 (0;1)), e(~ d) = B ~ d (B > 0,  2 (0;1))
and ~ U = log ~ cm + log ~ co ( 2 (0;1)). The simulation results reported in Table 2 all assume  = 1;
n = 0; A = 1; B = 1. The rst three columns therein show that the combinations between laissez-
faire and optimal values of ~ k and ~ d represented by cell a11 [case (i)], a21 [cases (ii)-(iv)] and a22
10(i)  = :2; = :9; = :1 ~ k
LF > ~ k ~ d
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2   ~ kLF

> 1
Table 2: Simulations in the Cobb-Douglas case, with  = 1; n = 0; A = 1; B = 1
[case (v)] in Table 1 are indeed feasible.
The next step, of course, refers to the content of the feasible cells in Table 1, i.e., the relationship
between f0(~ kLF) and (1 + gLF)(1 + n) for each of them. To this end, we can go back to the
general case and use the fact that f0(:) [resp. e(:)] is monotonically decreasing [resp. increasing]
in its argument. Thus, when ~ kLF > ~ k and ~ dLF > ~ d, one has the following chain of inequalities:
f0(~ kLF) 6 f0(~ k) = (1+g)(1+n) < (1+gLF)(1+n). From this the sign in cell a11 in Table 1 arises. A
similar argument applies to the sign in cell a22. However, this approach implies an ambiguous sign in
a21, since, when ~ kLF < ~ k and ~ dLF > ~ d, we have f0(~ kLF) > f0(~ k) = (1+g)(1+n) < (1+gLF)(1+n).
This indeterminacy can be conrmed resorting again to the Cobb-Douglas case in Table 2. As shown
by cases (ii)-(iv), the relationship between the interest rate and the growth rate of the economy
when ~ kLF < ~ k and ~ dLF > ~ d is ambiguous (row (ii) on the one hand and rows (iii) and (iv) on the
other). This seems particularly interesting, since, in spite of having under-accumulation of physical
capital with respect to the Golden Rule, the over-accumulation of human capital may give rise to
a marginal product f0(~ kLF) lower than the growth rate of the economy (1 + gLF)(1 + n).
Thus far, however, we have not tried to provide a clear-cut answer to the question of whether
the laissez-faire equilibrium is dynamically ecient or inecient. An intuitive (albeit rigorous) way
to address the dynamic eciency of a balanced growth path will consist in exploring whether an
expansion of the consumption possibility locus is achievable. In particular, we can evaluate the





e(~ dLF)(1 + n)
= f(~ kLF)   (1 + n)~ dLF   e(~ dLF)(1 + n)~ kLF (31)
11and ask whether, for a given ~ co
LF, we can increase ~ cm
LF by changing ~ kLF and/or ~ dLF:7 We are then
interested in evaluating @~ cm
LF=@~ kLF and @~ cm
LF=@ ~ dLF: In particular, a negative sign of the rst [resp.
second] derivative would imply that we are able expand the feasibility constraint by reducing ~ k
[resp. ~ d]. If any of them is negative (or both, of course), the laissez faire equilibrium would be
dynamically inecient. Symmetrically, if both expressions are positive, the laissez-faire equilibrium
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The information contained in Table 1 can be used to evaluate (32) and (33). Concerning (32),
if f0(~ kLF) < (1 + gLF)(1 + n), a small reduction in the amount of physical capital (as measured
by ~ k) would expand consumption possibilities and welfare. With respect to (33), it is proved in
Appendix B that, whenever f0(~ kLF) 6 (1 + gLF)(1 + n), a small decrease in the amount of human
capital (as measured by ~ d) would expand consumption possibilities and hence utility. Thus, if
f0(~ kLF) 6 (1 + gLF)(1 + n), the laissez faire equilibrium is dynamically inecient.
From Table 1 and the above discussion, it is now apparent that dynamic ineciency is associated
with ~ dLF > ~ d, i.e., a too high accumulation of human capital. But, interestingly, this may coexist
with either ~ kLF > ~ k, or ~ kLF < ~ k, i.e., with either a too high or too low accumulation of physical
capital (cells a11 and a21 in Table 1). This allows to state the following proposition:
Proposition 2 A laissez-faire equilibrium characterized by a marginal product of physical capital
lower than the growth rate of the economy is dynamically inecient, in the sense that a reduction of
either physical or human capital would expand consumption possibilities and welfare. This balanced
growth path is necessarily associated with an accumulation of human capital greater than that in the
Golden Rule, but may be coupled with an accumulation of physical capital either greater or less than
that in the Golden Rule.
Turning now to the laissez-faire equilibria where f0(~ kLF) > (1 + gLF)(1 + n), it is clear from
(32) that the only way to expand consumption possibilities is to increase, rather than decrease ~ k.
Thus, starting from the resources available along a balanced growth path, there is no scope for
raising welfare by modifying the amount of physical capital. In contrast, there may be welfare
improvements derived from changing the amount of human capital. The reason becomes apparent
when one observes in Table 1 that a situation where the marginal product of physical capital
exceeds the growth rate of the economy is always associated with ~ kLF < ~ k but may be associated
with either ~ dLF > ~ d or ~ dLF 6 ~ d (cells a21 and a22). In words, although the amount of physical
7In the model without productivity growth, or with g exogenously given, a simpler procedure suces. Since by
denition g is a constant (and ~ d can be forced to be zero), the LHS of (31), i.e., total consumption per unit of ecient
labour, can be taken as a single entity: we can simply dierentiate the whole RHS with respect to ~ kLF to get (32).
12capital will be denitely lower than that in the Golden Rule, the amount of human capital may
be either higher or lower than that prevailing along the Golden Rule. As proved in Appendix B,
when f0(~ kLF) > (1 + gLF)(1 + n), the derivative (33) may have any sign, with the consequence
that nothing can be said with generality about the eects on welfare of a small reduction of ~ d on
consumption possibilities and welfare along a balanced growth path. This claim is illustrated in the
third, fourth and fth rows in Table 2 for dierent constellations of the parameters of the production
and utility functions in the Cobb-Douglas case. In all of them, the marginal product of physical
capital is greater than the growth rate of the economy (and, of course, ~ kLF < ~ k) but in cases (iii)
and (iv) it is true that ~ dLF > ~ d, whereas ~ dLF < ~ d in (v). More importantly, @~ cm
LF=@ ~ dLF is positive
in cases (iv) and (v), so that there is no scope for increasing welfare out of existing resources, but
it is denitely negative in case (iii): a small reduction in ~ d would enhance welfare along a balanced
growth path. We can thus state the following proposition
Proposition 3 In a laissez-faire equilibrium, a marginal product of physical capital greater than the
growth rate of the economy is a necessary but not a sucient condition for the dynamic eciency
of the balanced growth path.
Proposition 3 is a consequence of the fact that, in spite of the accumulation of physical capital
being smaller than that in the Golden Rule, the accumulation of human capital may be either greater
or less than its counterpart along the Golden Rule balanced growth path. This is equivalent to saying
that, in order to assess the dynamic eciency of the laissez-faire equilibrium in this framework,
neither the relationship between ~ kLF and ~ k nor the one between f0(~ kLF) and (1 + gLF)(1 + n) are
enough, i.e., we also need to compare ~ dLF and ~ d. This is in contrast to what is argued by Boldrin
and Montes (2005). Indeed, they claim that "a sucient condition for the equilibrium path to be
dynamically ecient is that the gross rate of return on capital be larger than or equal to one plus
the growth rate of output" (p. 656), which will be the case "for reasonable values of" the parameters
involved in the production and utility functions (p. 657). Proposition 3 shows that, if we adopt the
Golden Rule approach, it is not a sucient but a necessary condition. Moreover, we have found
that, for (equally) reasonable values of the parameters, the laissez-faire equilibrium is dynamically
inecient in the Golden Rule sense.
5 Optimal Public Policy
We are now in a position to discuss the optimal policy, i.e., the orthopaedics that allow to convert
the laissez-faire equilibrium into the optimal Golden Rule balanced growth path. Firstly, we can
deal with the optimal education subsidy and then investigate the direction of the optimal intergen-
erational transfer (i.e., from/to the middle-aged to/from the elderly). Using (6) and (8), condition
(7) can be expressed as:
e0(~ d)

[f(~ k)   (1 + g)(1 + n)~ k]   (1 + g)(1 + n)~ k   (1 + n)~ d   ~ cm


= (1 + g)(1 + n) (34)
13This can be rewritten in a way that can be compared to the condition associated with the
individual's choice of education in the presence of government, (23):
e0(~ d)










with (~ k; ~ d) = (1 + g)(1 + n)~ k + (1 + n)~ d + ~ cm
 > 0: It is clear, from mere comparison of
(23) and (35), that the optimal value of the tax parameter addressed to education, , is actually
negative:
 =  
e0(~ d)(~ k; ~ d)
f0(~ k)
< 0 (36)
This allows to state the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Decentralizing the Golden Rule balanced growth path entails  < 0, i.e., education
should be taxed.
The intuition of this result can be easily grasped when one compares the structures of marginal
benets and marginal costs underlying the decisions of the social planner and the individual. On
the one hand, the marginal benet for the social planner from an increase in ~ d is the enhanced
consumption possibilities (captured by the term involving ~ co
 in (10)) that stem from a rise in g.
The marginal costs of raising ~ d include the direct cost (reduced consumption possibilities) and the
indirect cost (requirement to increase investment in physical capital in order to keep ~ k constant)
collected in the RHS of in (10). On the other hand, as it is clear from (23) with  = 0, in the
laissez faire the marginal benet of a unit of output invested by the individual in education in the
rst period is the increase in second-period earnings, and the marginal cost is the interest factor
to be paid. When one compares (23) with  = 0 and (35) it is clear that, if the individual were
confronted with the (optimal) wage and interest rates, f(~ k)   ~ kf0(~ k) and f0(~ k), she would fail
to take into account the terms collected by (~ k; ~ d), i.e., the investment in physical capital (per
unit of ecient labour) required to keep ~ k constant ((1+g)(1+n)~ k), its counterpart, referred to
~ d ((1 + n)~ k), as well as the total consumption of the middle aged (per unit of ecient labour)
necessary to keep ~ cm
 constant. In these circumstances, as the individual does not account for these
costs, she over-invests in education and a tax is required to attain the Golden Rule.8
This is in sharp contrast with previous results. For example, Docquier et al. (2007) show that,
when the social planner maximizes an innite sum of utilities (with consumption measured in output
per unit of natural labour), education subsidies are positive along the optimal balanced growth path.
This is due to the presence of a positive intergenerational externality: when choosing their education
level, individuals do not take into account that their decisions not only aect their own income but
also that of their children through the inherited human capital. In our framework, when choosing
how much to invest in education, the individual fails to account, not for indirect benets of their
8It is worth recalling that, in our model, individuals have access to perfect credit markets where they can borrow
to nance their preferred amount of education.
14educational decision on future generations, but for indirect costs supported by all generations alike.
Indeed, under the Golden Rule criterion, all generations obtain the same utility. These dierences
in results simply stem from a dierence in social objectives. As we mentioned in the introduction,
the Golden Rule approach is most pertinent if we think that, as productivity increases, consumption
per unit of natural labour (and, consequently, both physical and human capital per unit of natural
labour) has to increase at the same rate in order to maintain well-being. If we adopt this view,
education should be taxed along the optimal balanced growth path. Nevertheless, as discussed in
the next section, positive education subsidies can be welfare improving under certain conditions out
of the Golden Rule balanced growth path.
It is worth mentioning that Proposition 4 does not depend on the specic way education subsidies
are modelled, i.e., subsidies to the repayment of the loans. As we have seen, this result is directly
driven from the optimality conditions and makes no use of the government budget constraint. Thus,
as noted previously (see footnote 5) the fact that education should be taxed is independent of the
way we model government intervention in education investments.9
We can now turn to the issue of the direction of the optimal intergenerational transfers, and,
in particular, whether they adopt the form of positive or negative lump-sum taxes on the older
generation. As shown in Appendix D, a clear-cut result can be obtained, which can be summarized
in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Decentralizing the Golden Rule balanced growth path involves ~ zo
 < 0, i.e., positive
pensions to the elderly.
It should be stressed that, in contrast to the result referred to the optimal education tax, the
sign of the optimal transfers to the old-aged underlying Proposition 5 is not robust, and depends
crucially on the way public nances are modelled.
6 Comparative Dynamics
The preceding section has characterized the sign of the tax parameters that allow to decentralize the
Golden Rule balanced growth path. The current one emphasizes a related but conceptually dierent
issue: the comparative dynamics, in terms of (both physical and human) capital accumulation and
welfare, of variations in the level of intergenerational transfers and the tax parameter addressed to
education decisions, when the economy follows an arbitrary balanced growth path.
The relevant functional forms to address the comparative dynamics are (26), (27) and (30).
Starting with the rst of them, as argued in Section 3 and shown in Appendix A, it is implicitly
9This means that Proposition 4 holds when the government directly subsidizes education expenditures in the rst





tLt 1 = tdtLt+1 where t is the subsidy rate to the education expenditures of the Lt+1 members of the younger
generation. This has obvious consequences for the individual budget constraint and the equilibrium condition in the
market for physical capital, but does not aect the result that, along the Golden Rule balanced growth path, the
optimal education subsidy is negative, i.e., it is a tax.




















where 0 < 
 = 1 @	(:)=@~ k < 1 along a locally stable balanced growth path. In words, (37) implies
that the larger are the taxes paid by the middle-aged, other things being the same, the lower is the
~ k ratio. Thus, the message emerging from exogenous growth models with a pure life-cycle saving
motive continues to hold in the current framework: intergenerational transfers from the middle aged
to the elderly depress savings and physical capital accumulation (as measured by ~ k). Now, we can




, which, as discussed in Section 3, implicitly characterizes
(27). Since @=@~ k > 0, it follows that @ ~ d(~ zm;)=@~ zm = (@(:)=@~ k)(@~ k(:)=@~ zm) < 0. Therefore, the
above result concerning physical capital can be extended to human capital: transfers from younger
to older generations not only reduce the accumulation of physical capital (as measured by ~ k) but
also the accumulation of human capital (as measured by ~ d) and the growth rate of the economy.
As far as the eects of changes in the education subsidy are concerned, one would be tempted to
advance that an increased  will translate into a higher value of ~ d. As @=@ > 0, this is certainly the
case when ~ k is held constant in the expression characterizing the individual's decision on education,
~ d = (~ k;). However, this is nothing else but a partial-equilibrium result that neglects the eects
of the tax subsidy on ~ k. As it will be seen shortly, when these eects are taken into account, it is
impossible to say in general whether higher education subsidies will have a positive or a negative
eect on the accumulation of human capital (as measured by ~ d) and the economy's growth rate.
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where the rst two terms in the second part of (38) are positive while the two latter are negative.
This indeterminacy reects the complexity of the underlying interaction between the subsidy rate
and the consumption and education decisions, and implies that the eect of the subsidy on the ~ d
ratio is also ambiguous:











The previous results can be summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 When the starting point is any arbitrary balanced growth path, a lump-sum transfer
from the middle-aged to the elderly translates into a smaller accumulation of both physical and
human capital (and thus a smaller growth rate), but a change in the rate of education subsidy may
have either a positive or negative eect on both.
16We can now focus on the welfare eects, along a balanced growth path, of changing the tax
parameters. The conclusion obtained in overlapping generations models with exogenous growth is
well known: when the marginal product of physical capital is lower [resp. higher] than the economy's
growth rate (reecting over [resp. under] accumulation of physical capital), a lump-sum transfer
from [resp. to] younger to [resp. from] older generations provides a means to bring the economy
closer to the Golden Rule. However, as our analysis will show, in the current model where human
capital is the engine of growth, this condition is not enough any longer, and further requirements































with a similar expression for the changes in . As shown in Appendix E, using (28), (29), the
lifetime budget constraint and the equilibrium condition in the market for physical capital, (40) can
be rewritten:
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(41)







(1 + r)(:)(1   )e0(:)
(1 + g)2 +
~ zm(1 + n)e0(:)
1 + r
 
[(1 + g)(1 + n)   (1 + r)]
(1 + g)
(42)
In order to interpret (41), it is important to realize that @^ !=@ ~ d captures the eect of a change
in the accumulation of human capital (as measured by ~ d) on the present value of the individual's
lifetime resources for given values of w, r, ~ zm and . This can easily be checked by partial dier-
entiation of (25). It can also be veried that this expression cannot be signed in general. Overall,
the rst term in the RHS of (41) reects the eect of the change in ~ k induced by the lump-sum
tax on the middle aged, while the second term reects the direct eect of ~ zm on welfare. Clearly,
if [(1 + g)(1 + n)   (1 + r)] and @^ !=@ ~ d have opposite signs, (41) can be signed without ambiguity,
and we can enunciate the following proposition.
Proposition 7 A lump-sum transfer from the middle-aged to the elderly entails a welfare increase
[resp. decrease] along a balanced growth path provided that: (i) the economy's growth rate is greater
[resp. less] than the interest rate, and (ii) investing in education reduces [resp. increases], at the
margin, the present value of the individual's lifetime resources. Otherwise, the eects of intergen-
erational transfers on welfare along the balanced growth path are ambiguous.
The intuition is simple and highlights the importance of both (i) and (ii) being simultaneously
fullled. As for (i), it is actually what arises from an exogenous growth model when ~ zm and ~ zo
are respectively interpreted as the tax paid and the pension received in a pure pay-as-you-go social
17security system: if (1 + g)(1 + n) > (1 + r), so that the rate of return of "investing in future
generations" exceeds that of investing in physical capital, an additional amount paid to social
security will expand consumption possibilities and welfare. But, in an endogenous growth setting,
the above condition must also be accompanied by (ii): since increasing ~ zm depresses ~ k and thus
discourages investments in ~ d, welfare will unambiguously increase along the balanced growth path
only if, in addition to (1 + g)(1 + n) > (1 + r), the reduced human capital accumulation translates
into a greater lifetime income, i.e., @^ !=@ ~ d < 0. The argument should be accordingly reversed when
the starting point entails (1 + g)(1 + n) < (1 + r) and @^ !=@ ~ d > 0. It is important to stress that, if
[(1 + g)(1 + n)   (1 + r)] and @^ !=@ ~ d have the same sign, the nal eect is indeterminate.
Following the same steps, the eects of an increase in the education subsidy rate on welfare
along a balanced growth path can be summarized in the following expression:




















where N = (1 + r)(:)=(1 + g) and P = (1 + r)(@(:)=@) are both positive. It is clear from
mere inspection that the rst terms in the RHS of (41) and (43) have the same structure, i.e.,
they capture the eect on ~ k induced by a small change in a tax parameter. But this should not
obscure the fact that while @~ k=@~ zm can be signed, @~ k=@ cannot. Indeed, only if (38) happens to
be positive, (43) will also have a clear-cut sign whenever [(1 + g)(1 + n)   (1 + r)] and @^ !=@ ~ d have
opposite signs, i.e.,
Proposition 8 Provided that education subsidies foster physical capital accumulation, they will also
increase [resp. decrease] welfare along a balanced growth path whenever: (i) the economy's growth
rate is lower [resp. higher] than the interest rate, and (ii) investing in education increases [resp.
decreases], at the margin, the present value of the individual's lifetime resources.
The intuition underlying this result is similar to the one in Proposition 7. But in addition to
the requirement that [(1 + g)(1 + n)   (1 + r)] and @^ !=@ ~ d have opposite signs, the exigency that
@~ k=@ > 0 now becomes crucial. If, instead, @~ k=@ < 0, the sign of (43) is ambiguous and nothing
can be said with generality.
To conclude, we can relate the discussion of the comparative dynamics to the one in Section 4 on
optimal tax policy. Optimal intergenerational transfers, ~ zm
 , and education subsidies/taxes, , will
be simultaneously determined by @ ~ V (:)=@~ zm = 0 and @ ~ V (:)=@ = 0. Using (41) and (43), it is clear
that (1+g)(1+n) = (1+r) and @^ !=@ ~ d = 0 provide a solution to this system of equations. The rst
of them is nothing else but (6), i.e., the equality between the marginal product of physical capital,
f0(~ k), and the growth rate of the economy, (1+g)(1+n), along the Golden Rule balanced growth
path. The second one does not seem to be so obvious. However, after some manipulation, using the
individual budget constraint and the physical capital market equilibrium condition, the expression
18@^ !=@ ~ d = 0 transforms into (7) when evaluated at the Golden Rule. In sum, we are back to the
discussion and the results in Section 4: along the Golden Rule balanced growth path, education
should be taxed and the members of the older generation should receive a positive pension.
7 Concluding comments
This paper has focused on the relationship among education subsidies, a scheme of intergenera-
tional transfers and welfare in a life-cycle growth model with both physical and human capital.
The welfare objective has been taken to be the Golden Rule, i.e., the balanced growth path that
maximizes the lifetime welfare of a representative individual subject to the feasibility constraint and
the requirement that everyone else's welfare is xed at the same level. And we have done so in the
only sensible way in an endogenous growth framework, i.e., by considering a utility function whose
arguments are individual consumptions measured in terms of output per unit of ecient (instead
of natural) labour. We have compared the physical and human capital to ecient labour ratios
under the laissez faire with perfect credit markets and the Golden Rule, and it has been shown
that whether the rate of return to physical capital is higher or lower than the growth rate of the
economy is not enough to assess the eciency of the competitive equilibrium. The reason can be
found in the fact that, even if physical capital investments are too low at the laissez-faire economy,
human capital investments can be too large.
We have also shown that the laissez-faire equilibrium cannot possibly support the Golden Rule
balanced growth path. Actually, along the Golden Rule balanced growth path, the optimal ed-
ucation subsidy is negative, i.e., the social planner should be taxing education investments. The
intuition is that, if individuals faced the optimal (i.e., Golden Rule) wage and interest rates in
a laissez faire framework, they would dismiss some of the ensuing costs and would over-invest in
education. Nevertheless, under certain conditions, positive education subsidies may still be welfare
improving when the starting point is a non-optimal arbitrary balanced growth path. As far as
intergenerational transfers are concerned, when the tax parameter addressed to education is related
to loan repayments, a strong case can be made for the existence of a positive transfer to old-aged
individuals (i.e., positive pensions).
To conclude, it is clear that some of the assumptions underlying the model, particularly that of
perfect credit markets, are not realistic and must somehow be relaxed. Indeed, policy conclusions
may be quite sensitive not only to whether or not individuals face constraints when trying to borrow
to nance their education investments but also to the reasons for these constraints. It seems fair to
say that more research on this subject is warranted.
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20Appendix
A. Derivation of equation ~ kt+1 = 	(~ kt; ~ zm
t ; ~ zm
t+1;t;t+1)
The equilibrium condition in the market for physical capital, given by (21), can be written
Kt+1 =






Lt   (1 + n)dtLt (A.1)








  dt(1   t+1) (A.2)
with !t given by (20). Writing dt = (~ kt+1;t+1)h
y





tht, we can manipulate and rewrite (A.2) as:
~ kt+1 =
(1   (rt+1)) ^ !t






(1   t+1)(~ kt+1;t+1)
e((~ kt+1;t+1))
(A.4)
This expression implicitly provides ~ kt+1 as a function of ~ kt; ~ zm
t ; ~ zm
t+1;t; t+1.
B. Formal proofs corresponding to Section 4
We rst study the dierent possibilities regarding, on the one hand, the relationship between ~ kLF
and ~ k and, on the other, ~ dLF and ~ d. Also, we address whether the laissez-faire equilibrium can
be optimal. Using (6) and (8) we can rewrite (7) as
e0(~ d)

f(~ k)   ~ kf0(~ k)   (~ k; ~ d)

= f0(~ k) (B.1)
with (~ k; ~ d) = (1 + g)(1 + n)~ k + (1 + n)~ d + ~ cm
 > 0: This optimality condition can now be
readily compared to the one characterizing the laissez-faire choice of education (23) with  = 0 and
using factor prices in (11) and (12):
e0(~ dLF)

f(~ kLF)   ~ kLFf0(~ kLF)

= f0(~ kLF) (B.2)
Suppose that ~ kLF > ~ k; then f0(~ kLF) 6 f0(~ k) and f(~ kLF)   ~ kLFf0(~ kLF) > f(~ k)   ~ kf0(~ k):
One then obtains, letting (~ k) = f0(~ k)=(f(~ k)   ~ kf0(~ k)),
e0(~ dLF) = (~ kLF) 6 (~ k) < (~ k) + e0(~ d) = e0(~ d) (B.3)
and, therefore, ~ dLF > ~ d: Hence, ~ kLF > ~ k is not compatible with ~ dLF 6 ~ d, implying that cell
a12 in Table 1 is not feasible. It also follows that, even if it happens that ~ kLF = ~ k, it will be
the case that ~ dLF > ~ d. Consequently, even if the accumulation of physical capital is optimal, the
accumulation of human capital will not. To show that the laissez faire will never be able to reach
21the optimal allocation, it suces to show that, even if the accumulation of human capital is optimal,
the accumulation of physical capital will not. Indeed, suppose that ~ dLF = ~ d; then
(~ kLF) = e0(~ dLF) = e0(~ d) = (~ k) + e0(~ d) > (~ k) (B.4)
and this necessarily implies that ~ kLF < ~ k:
If we now consider the case where ~ kLF < ~ k, so that (~ kLF) > (~ k), following the same steps
as before, we get
e0(~ dLF) = (~ kLF) 7 (~ k) + e0(~ d) = e0(~ d) (B.5)
from which ~ dLF 7 ~ d. This indeterminacy is illustrated in Table 2 by simulations (ii)-(iv) on the
one hand and (v) on the other.
Secondly, in order to address the dynamic eciency or ineciency of the laissez-faire equilibrium,
we can evaluate the sign of (33). Using (8), one has
e0(~ dLF)

f(~ kLF)   (1 + gLF)(1 + n)~ kLF   LF(~ kLF; ~ dLF)

R (1 + gLF)(1 + n) (B.6)
where LF(~ kLF; ~ dLF) = (1 + gLF)(1+n)~ kLF +(1+n)~ dLF +~ cLF > 0: In order to account for the fact
that in general at the laissez-faire f0(~ kLF) R (1 + gLF)(1+n) we write (1 + gLF)(1+n) = f0(~ kLF)+"





f0(~ kLF) + "











 "~ kLF   
LF (~ kLF; ~ dLF)

R " (B.8)
Therefore, if " > 0 (i.e., f0(~ kLF) 6 (1 + gLF)(1 + n)) the sign of (B.8) is negative and we can
conclude that, whenever f0(~ kLF) 6 (1 + gLF)(1 + n) the equilibrium is dynamically inecient.
Note, in Table 1, that this result applies even if ~ kLF < ~ k; as long as f0(~ kLF) 6 (1 + gLF)(1 + n):
However, if " > 0 (i.e., f0(~ kLF) > (1 + gLF)(1 + n)) the sign of (B.8) is ambiguous in general.
Although according to the table, this situation can only correspond to ~ kLF < ~ k, there is still scope
for a Pareto improvement provided that the sign of (B.8) is negative. This is possible, as illustrated
by simulation (iii) in Table 2.
C. The Cobb-Douglas Case
Consider the functional forms presented in section 4, f(~ k) = A~ k, e(~ d) = B ~ d and ~ U = log ~ cm +





= (1 + g)(1 + n) (C.1)
and (9) is 1 + g = B ~ d







   (1 + n)B ~ d
~ k   (1 + n)~ d

(1 + n)B ~ d
 (C.2)
22Also, f0(~ k) = A~ k 1
 and e0(~ d) = B ~ d 1







   (1 + n)B ~ d
~ k   (1 + n)~ d





= (1 + )(1 + n)B ~ d
 (C.3)
while (6) is A~ k 1
 = (1 + n)B ~ d
: These two equations, allow to characterize (~ k; ~ d):
With respect to the laissez-faire, note rst that savings are st =

1+!t and, from (23), the op-
timal choice of education is dt 1 =
(1 )
 kt: This allows to write the physical capital market equi-
librium condition (21) as a non-linear rst-order dierential equation in ~ k, i.e., ~ kt+1 = G(:)~ k
(1 )
t ,
where G(:) is a constant that depends on , , , n, , A and B. The balanced growth path with


































Using (C.4) and (C.5) one can construct the simulation results reported in Table 2.
D. Proof of Proposition 5
The equilibrium condition in the market for physical capital, (21), can be rewritten along a balanced
growth path as:
(1 + g)(1 + n)~ k = w  
1 + r
1 + g
~ d(1   )   ~ zm   ~ cm   (1 + n)~ d (D.1)
On the other hand, from the individual budget constraint (24), and using (25) and (D.1):
~ co








We now turn to (7). Evaluating (D.2) at the Golden Rule, i.e. for the optimal tax parameters
~ zm
 and , and making use of the fact that 1 + g = e(~ d), we obtain:
e0(~ d)
e(~ d)=~ d







(1 + g)(1 + n)
!
< 0 (D.3)
By the concavity of e(:), e0(~ d) < e(~ d)=~ d so that the LHS of this expression is negative. It then
follows that the expression in parenthesis on the RHS is also negative. Now, writing the government
23budget constraint (18) in units of ecienct labour yields ~ zm+~ zo=[(1+g)(1+n)] = (1+r)~ d=(1+g).
Then, at the Golden Rule:
~ zo








(1 + g)(1 + n)
(D.4)
which is negative by (D.3), thus implying that ~ zo
 must be negative, i.e., pensions must be positive.
E. Welfare eects of modifying the tax parameters
The comparative dynamics in terms of welfare along a balanced growth path are given by @ ~ V (:)=@~ zm
and @ ~ V (:)=@. Starting from (40), note rst that @V=@^ ! and @V=@r are respectively provided by
(28) and (29). In (29) we substitute ~ co=(1 + r) from (D.2). Second, @~ k=@~ zm is given by (37) and









(1   )(1 + g)   (1 + r)(1   )(:)e0(:)
@(:)
@~ k








(1 + r)   f00(:)[(1 + r)   (1 + g)(1 + n)]
(1 + r)2  






@~ zm =  
[(1 + r)   (1 + g)(1 + n)]
1 + r
(E.2)
Rearranging terms, we obtain (41).





















(1 + r)(:)e0(:)(1   )
(1 + g)2 +




Rearranging terms, (43) results.
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